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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 




 Plaintiff Joseph Egan brought suit against defendant 
Delaware River Port Authority, claiming that the Port 
Authority discriminated against him in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 
et seq. (the “ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”), and 
retaliated against him for exercising his right to take leave 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2601 et seq. (the “FMLA”).  A jury found that he was not 
the victim of discrimination or retaliation.  Egan appeals, 
arguing that the District Court erred in: (a) refusing to give a 
mixed-motive jury instruction in connection with his FMLA 
claim; and (b) excluding testimony from one of Egan’s co-
workers.  
 
 To resolve this appeal, we must examine the regulation 
upon which Egan’s FMLA retaliation claim is based and 
determine whether there is any requirement that a plaintiff 
introduce direct evidence of retaliation to pursue a mixed-
motive theory of liability.  As we will explain, the 
Department of Labor (the “DOL”) acted within its authority 
to promulgate the regulation and the regulation’s language 
permits a plaintiff to rely on such a theory so long as the 
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, permits a 
reasonable juror to conclude that the plaintiff’s use of FMLA 
leave was a negative factor in the employer’s adverse 
employment decision.  Because the District Court erred in 
requiring Egan to provide direct evidence of retaliation, we 
will vacate the FMLA verdict and remand on that claim.   
 
 As to Egan’s ADA claim, because the Court acted 
within its discretion in excluding the testimony of Egan’s co-
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worker, it did not commit reversible error impacting those 
claims, and we will affirm the verdict in favor of the Port 




 Egan worked for the Port Authority from July 2008 
until October 2012.  He was hired as a Projects Manager for 
Special Projects.  His primary responsibility was to manage 
fleet assets such as police vehicles, heavy equipment, and 
other vehicles.  During his first two years of employment, 
only a small percentage of his work involved “economic 
development,” which concerned the Port Authority’s efforts 
to improve the communities in surrounding areas.  App. 150-
51.  He did not perform any economic development work 
after 2010.   
 
 Egan reported to Deputy CEO Robert Gross until 
February 2012, when Michael Conallen replaced Gross.  In 
March 2012, following a meeting with Conallen, Egan was 
transferred on special assignment to the Engineering 
Department and began reporting to Michael Venuto, the Port 
Authority’s Chief Engineer.  He was not given a new job 
description, and the duration of the assignment was not 
determined at that time.   
 
 Egan has suffered from migraine headaches since a 
1995 accident.  Egan testified that the frequency of his 
migraines increased “almost instantaneously” with his 
transfer to the Engineering Department, and he applied for 
FMLA leave in April 2012.  App. 77.  The Port Authority 
approved Egan’s request for intermittent FMLA leave.  An 
issue arose in July 2012 because Egan had been reporting 
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only the “approximate” number of hours he had worked, 
rather than the actual number of hours he had worked and 
took FMLA leave, and this discrepancy in Egan’s reported 
hours “appear[ed] to be causing a hardship in his 
department.”  App. 612.   
 
 Evidence concerning this alleged “hardship” was 
adduced during discovery.  The parties deposed one of Egan’s 
Engineering Department co-workers, Mark Green.  Green 
testified that he overheard a conversation between Egan and 
Venuto in which Venuto complained, in an “upset and angry” 
tone, about Egan’s ability to complete tasks because of health 
issues.  App. 611.  Egan sought to elicit testimony about this 
conversation from Green at trial but the District Court 
precluded it because Green was not a participant in the 
conversation and heard only part of it while walking by 
Egan’s office and, to permit it, would be misleading to the 
jury.   
 
 During trial, Egan did not recount such a conversation 
with Venuto.  Instead, in response to the question, “Did 
[Venuto] ever say anything to you that indicated he was 
unhappy with the way you were using FMLA leave?”, Egan 
testified: 
 
A.  Well, on one occasion he came into my 
office and wanted me to—he was angry.  He 
was upset.  I was there working and he said in 
the future he wanted me when I left the 
premises to wave to his assistant as I was 
leaving, and that is somewhat unusual so— 
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Q.  Did you feel that that suggested that he was 
unhappy with the way you were using FMLA 
leave? 
A.  I think there was a connection and that’s 
speculation on my part, but I felt that way. 
 
App. 108-09.  Egan also confirmed the accuracy of the 
following deposition testimony: 
 
Did [Venuto] ever say anything to you that 
indicated that he was not happy with your usage 





 In August 2012, Venuto informed Conallen that he 
would not request positions for Egan and another employee.  
In addition, in October 2012, the Port Authority decided to 
eliminate its economic development positions.  Thereafter, 
and while he was on FMLA leave, Egan was informed that all 
“economic development functions” were being eliminated, 
his “temporary reassignment” to the Engineering Department 
was “deemed completed,” and he was terminated. App. 90.   
 
 Egan filed a complaint alleging violations of the 
ADEA, ADA, and FMLA.  After discovery and motion 
practice, the case proceeded to trial.  During the trial, the jury 
heard testimony from Egan, Venuto, and Green, among 
others.  After the presentation of the evidence, the District 
Court resolved a dispute concerning the jury instructions.  At 
the Court’s request, the parties presented a joint set of 
instructions that included the Third Circuit Model Civil Jury 
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Instructions 10.1.3 and 10.1.2, respectively embodying the 
pretext and mixed-motive theories for proving 
discrimination.1  The District Court denied Egan’s request for 
a mixed-motive instruction for his FMLA retaliation claim, 
concluding that a mixed-motive instruction was not warranted 
because it should not be given in the FMLA context and, in 
any event, Egan had not presented direct evidence of 
retaliation.   
 
                                                                
 1 “Generally speaking, in a ‘mixed-motive’ case a 
plaintiff claims that an employment decision was based on 
both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.  Such cases are in 
contrast to so-called ‘pretext’ cases, in which a plaintiff 
claims that an employer’s stated justification for an 
employment decision is false.”  Connelly v. Lane Constr. 
Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016).  Both theories have 
been used in FMLA cases in this Circuit.  See, e.g., Budhun 
v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 256-57 (3d Cir. 
2014) (pretext theory); Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh 
Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2012) (mixed-
motive theory).  Under the FMLA regulation at issue in this 
case, a plaintiff pursuing a mixed-motive theory must show 
that exercise of FMLA rights was “a negative factor” in the 
employer’s employment decision.  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).  A 
plaintiff who proceeds to trial under a pretext theory must 
prove that a protected characteristic or the exercise of a 
protected right was a determinative factor and therefore had a 
determinative effect on the decision such that in the absence 
of the characteristic or protected conduct, the adverse 
employment action would not have occurred.  See Miller v. 
CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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 The jury returned a verdict for the Port Authority on 
all counts.  Egan appeals, arguing that the District Court erred 
in denying his request for the mixed-motive instruction for his 
FMLA claim and, with respect to the ADA and FMLA 
claims, erred in precluding him from presenting Green’s 






 We will first examine Egan’s challenge to the District 
Court’s ruling denying his request for a mixed-motive jury 
instruction in connection with his FMLA retaliation claim.  
When a party properly objects to a jury instruction, as here, 
“we exercise plenary review to determine whether the 
instruction misstated the applicable law.”  Franklin 
Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 338 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  In this case, this review entails determining 
whether the DOL properly exercised its authority to 
promulgate the regulation upon which Egan’s retaliation 
claim is based, and, if so, whether it embodies a reasonable 
construction of the FMLA, including whether its inclusion of 
a mixed-motive approach to liability is permitted under Gross 
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), and 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).  If such a theory is permissible, then 
we must decide whether a plaintiff is required to present 
direct evidence to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction. 
                                                                
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 








 Our Court has premised liability for FMLA retaliation 
claims on a DOL regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c), which 
embodies the DOL’s interpretation of the FMLA.  Until now, 
however, we have not been required to examine whether the 
regulation embodies a permissible construction of the FMLA 
to which we must defer under Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  To make this 
determination, we must answer two questions:  
 
First, always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  
If, however, the court determines Congress has 
not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute. 
 
Id. at 842-43.  The question of whether Congress has spoken 
on the question at issue is known as Chevron step one.  If we 
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determine that Congress has not spoken on the precise issue, 
then we proceed to what is known as Chevron step two, 
where we examine whether the interpretation of the statute as 
embodied in the regulation is reasonable. 
 
 At Chevron step one, courts may “‘employ [ ] 
traditional tools of statutory construction [to] ascertain[ ] that 
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue.’”  
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 112 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)).  We 
“read the language in [the] broader context of the statute as a 
whole.”  Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 794 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 2015).  
“If the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we 
uphold the plain meaning of the statute.”  Cheruku v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 662 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
 We thus turn to the language of the FMLA to 
determine whether it provides precise guidance as to whether 
the FMLA protects an employee from retaliation.  Under the 
FMLA, it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, 
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any 
right provided under this subchapter,” including the right to 
seek or use FMLA leave.  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).  The 
FMLA also makes it “unlawful for any employer to discharge 
or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for 
opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”  Id. 




 The statute does not specifically provide for a 
retaliation claim.3   In light of Congress’s language and goals, 
however, we cannot say that this silence means that Congress 
did not intend to protect those who invoke their FMLA rights 
from retribution.  Congress chose words that broadly protect 
individuals who invoke their FMLA rights.  For instance, in 
§ 2615(a)(1), Congress made it “unlawful for any employer to 
interfere with  . . . the exercise of  . . . any right provided” by 
the FMLA which includes the right to take up to “12 
workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period” if the 
employee has a “serious health condition that makes the 
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of 
such employee.”  29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).  This right could 
be interfered with by, for example, prohibiting the individual 
                                                                
 3 Our Court has described, in general terms, § 
2615(a)(1) as the “interference” provision and § 2615(a)(2) as 
the “retaliation” provision.  See Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 301; 
see also Hansler, 798 F.3d at 158 (“Retaliation claims arise 
out of the [FMLA’s] prohibition on employers ‘discharg[ing] 
or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against any individual 
for opposing any practice made unlawful’” (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) and citing § 825.220(c)).  The DOL, 
however, has concluded that retaliation flows from 
§ 2615(a)(1).  73 Fed. Reg. 67,986 (Nov. 17, 2008) (stating 
that “[a]lthough section 2615(a)(2) of the Act also may be 
read to bar retaliation . . . , the Department believes that 
section 2615(a)(1) provides a clearer statutory basis for 
§ 825.220(c)’s prohibition on discrimination and retaliation”).  
Since we are examining only the DOL’s interpretation of the 
interference provision of § 2615(a)(1), we need not address 
§ 2615(a)(2)’s prohibition of retaliation for “opposing any 
practice made unlawful” by the FMLA.   
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who has such a condition from being permitted to take such 
leave or by requiring the person to engage in significant work 
while on FMLA leave.  Interference could also occur if an 
employee fears that he or she will be retaliated against for 
taking such leave.  Thus, because the term “interfere with” is 
susceptible to multiple interpretations, and the statutory 
language does not directly address whether retaliation is 
among the actions an employer is prohibited from taking 
under the FMLA, Congress has not spoken on the “precise 
question” before us.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.   
 
 Therefore, we move to Chevron step two to determine 
whether the DOL’s interpretation of § 2615 to include 
prohibiting retaliation “is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute” to which we are required to defer.  Id. at 843.  
As the Chevron Court instructed, “legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 844.  “A court 
may conclude that a regulation is arbitrary and capricious 
only if the agency relied on facts other than those intended by 
Congress, did not consider an important aspect of the issue 
confronting the agency, provided an explanation for its 
decision which runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is entirely implausible.”  Gardner v. Grandolsky, 
585 F.3d 786, 790 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although our “inquiry into the 
facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of 
review is a narrow one,” and we are “not empowered to 
substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency.”  Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 
 Congress empowered the DOL to “prescribe such 
regulations as are necessary to carry out” the FMLA.  29 
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U.S.C. § 2654.  The DOL identified § 2615(a)(1) as the 
source of the prohibition against retaliation and promulgated 
a regulation that made retaliation for exercising FMLA rights 
unlawful.  The regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c), states that 
“[t]he Act’s prohibition against interference prohibits an 
employer from discriminating or retaliating against an 
employee or prospective employee for having exercised or 
attempted to exercise FMLA rights,” and further states that 
“employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a 
negative factor in employment actions.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.220(c).  
 
 We conclude that § 825.220(c) is a reasonable 
interpretation of § 2615(a)(1).  The DOL’s interpretation is 
consistent with the purposes of the FMLA, which include 
“entitl[ing] employees to take reasonable leave for medical 
reasons” without interference.  29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(2), 
2615(a)(1); Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 
1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing legislative history and 
stating, among other things, that “[t]he FMLA provides job 
security to employees who must be absent from work because 
of their own illnesses”).  Indeed, “the established 
understanding at the time the FMLA was enacted was that 
employer actions that deter employees’ participation in 
protected activities constitute ‘interference’ or ‘restraint’ with 
the employees’ exercise of their rights,” and “attaching 
negative consequences to the exercise of protected rights 
surely ‘tends to chill’ an employee’s willingness to exercise 
those rights.”  Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.  To allow an 
employer to take an adverse employment action against an 
employee who takes FMLA leave would “undoubtedly run 
contrary to Congress’s purpose in passing the FMLA.”  
Bryant v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 538 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 
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2008).  We agree with our colleagues in the Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits, as well as the Secretary of Labor, that “to permit 
employees to take leave from work for certain family and 
medical reasons and to return to the same or equivalent job at 
the conclusion of that leave” would be undermined if 
retaliation were not prohibited, Br. of Sec’y of Labor as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 8-9.  Thus, the 
regulation prohibiting retaliation for exercising FMLA rights 
is consistent with Congress’s goal of enabling workers to 




 Having concluded that the regulation is a reasonable 
interpretation of the FMLA’s interference provision, we must 
examine the DOL’s decision to impose a requirement to 
consider the reason for the employer’s action.  We conclude 
that it is appropriate for the DOL to set forth in the regulation 
what constitutes retaliation, including this requirement for 
such a claim.     
 
 The regulation precludes an employer from placing 
negative weight on the use of FMLA leave when making an 
employment decision.  As we explained in Lichtenstein v. 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 691 F.3d 294 (3d 
Cir. 2012), under the regulation, “employers are barred from 
considering an employee’s FMLA leave ‘as a negative factor’ 
in employment decisions,” and that “an employee does not 
need to prove that invoking FMLA rights was the sole or 
most important factor upon which the employer acted.”  Id. at 
301.  Thus, under the regulation, an employee who claims 
retaliation and seeks to proceed under a mixed-motive 
approach must show that his or her use of FMLA leave was 
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“a negative factor” in the employer’s adverse employment 
action.   
 
 Imposing this requirement makes sense, especially 
since a claim of retaliation includes an implication that the 
employer was motivated at least in part by the employee’s use 
of FMLA leave.  The interference provision of § 2615(a)(1) 
does not explicitly require a relationship between intent and 
outcome.  See id. at 312.  By including the “a negative factor” 
requirement, the DOL further addressed the gap left open by 
the statute’s silence on the availability of a claim of 
retaliation and recognized that such a claim requires proof 
that the employer’s motivation contributed to the adverse 
action.  Thus, the DOL did not act arbitrarily in including 




 We next consider whether the selection of a 
requirement that a plaintiff show only that the use of FMLA 
leave was a negative factor in the employer’s adverse job 
action, as opposed to the but-for cause of the action, is 
arbitrary or capricious.  Congress has embraced both but-for 
and mixed-motive approaches in its anti-discrimination laws, 
and so long as there is a nonarbitrary basis for the DOL to 
select a mixed-motive approach, we are required to defer to 
the agency.   
 
 In the ADEA and in Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision, Congress chose language that made clear that a 
plaintiff must prove “but-for” causation between the adverse 
employment action and the protected characteristic, in the 
case of the ADEA, and the protected act, in the case of Title 
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VII retaliation.  In Gross, the Supreme Court observed that 
“[u]nlike Title VII[’s anti-discrimination provision], the 
ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish 
discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating 
factor.”  557 U.S. at 174.  The text of the ADEA provides that 
an employer may not “‘fail or refuse to hire or . . . discharge 
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age.’”  Id. at 176 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) 
(emphasis in Gross)).  The Court reasoned “the ordinary 
meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that an employer took 
adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ 
that the employer decided to act,” and a plaintiff must 
therefore prove that age was a “but-for” cause of the 
employer’s adverse decision in order to establish a disparate-
treatment claim.  Id. at 176-77. 
 
 Similarly, in Nassar, the Supreme Court held that Title 
VII retaliation claims—where Title VII “makes it unlawful 
for an employer to take adverse employment action against an 
employee ‘because’ of certain criteria”—“require proof that 
the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged 
employment action.”  133 S. Ct. at 2528.  Notably, the Court 
distinguished Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision from its 
“principal” anti-discrimination provision, which states that a 
plaintiff establishes discrimination when he or she 
“demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor, for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice.”  Id. at 2526 
(emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).  The 
anti-discrimination provision, with its “lessened causation 
standard,” allows for a mixed-motive instruction.  See id.  
17 
 
Thus, based on the statutory language, the Court recognized 
that different causation standards may apply to different 
claims.  
 
 The FMLA interference provision on which the 
regulation is based does not provide a causation standard and 
thus does not unambiguously require the use of “but-for” 
causation.  See Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., 149 F. Supp. 3d 
195, 210 (D. Mass. 2016) (stating that “[t]he statute does not 
speak directly to standards for causation and provides no 
unambiguous indication that but-for causation is required” 
and concluding that § 825.220(c) is entitled to controlling 
Chevron deference), aff’d, 843 F.3d 553, 559 n.2 (1st Cir. 
2016) (taking no position on Chevron deference or 
§ 825.220(c)’s causation standard).  Section 825.220(c) fills 
in that gap.  Its text, which uses the phrase “a negative 
factor,” resembles the “lessened causation standard” in 
§ 2000e-2(m) and stands in contrast to the “because” 
language in the ADEA (at issue in Gross) and Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision (at issue in Nassar).   
 
 We cannot say that choosing something other than 
“but-for” causation is unreasonable.  As demonstrated above, 
Congress has endorsed the use of a lessened causation 
standard in Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions.  
Congress’s choice reflects a view that consideration of any of 
the protected characteristics set forth in the statute, namely 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, is never 
permissible, even if it is not the sole reason for the 
employment decision.  Similarly, in enacting the FMLA, 
Congress chose to ensure that those who need to address 
serious health issues may do so without interference.  The 
regulation precludes an employer from considering the use of 
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such leave as a negative factor in an employment decision.  
Thus, like Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision, it seeks to 
ensure that engaging in such protected activity does not 
negatively impact an employee.  This choice is consistent 
with Congress’s goals in enacting the FMLA and the sort of 
“legitimate policy choice[ ]” the agency is entitled to make.  
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866; Chase, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 210 
(“The relaxed causation standard provided by the [DOL] is 
precisely the sort of ‘legitimate policy choice[ ]’ that Chevron 
empowers a properly delegated agency to make.” (quoting 
Chevron, 476 U.S. at 866) (alteration in Chase)).  We cannot 
say this approach is arbitrary, and there is nothing to show 
that it is inconsistent with the teachings of Gross or Nassar.  
See Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 692 
(6th Cir. 2009) (observing that “[t]he phrase ‘a negative 
factor’ envisions that the challenged employment decision 
might also rest on other, permissible factors,” and thus 
“continu[ing] to find Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting 
framework applicable to FMLA retaliation claims” after 
Gross); see also Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122-25 (holding that 
§ 825.220(c) “is a reasonable interpretation of the statute’s 
prohibition on ‘interference with’ and ‘restraint of’ 
employee’s rights under the FMLA [§ 2615(a)(1)]” and that 
“[t]he Labor Department’s conclusion that employer use of 
‘the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in 
employment actions’ . . . violates . . . the Act is . . . a 
reasonable one”). 
 
 For these reasons, we hold that the DOL’s use of a 
mixed-motive framework is not inconsistent with Nassar and 
Gross, and the regulation’s mixed-motive approach is a 
permissible construction of the statute.  Therefore, 
§ 825.220(c) is entitled to controlling deference under 
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Chevron, and a mixed-motive jury instruction is available for 




Having concluded that a mixed-motive instruction is 
available for FMLA retaliation claims, the next question is 
the evidentiary threshold to obtain that instruction.  As 
explained below, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
direct evidence is not required to proceed under a mixed-
motive theory of liability.   
 
 In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), the 
Supreme Court held that direct evidence is not required for a 
court to deliver a mixed-motive jury instruction for Title VII 
claims under § 2000e-2(m).  Id. at 92, 101-02.  Section 
2000e-2(m) requires only that a plaintiff “‘demonstrat[e]’ that 
an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to 
‘any employment practice,’ which “[o]n its face . . . does not 
mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened 
showing through direct evidence.”  Id. at 98-99 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (alteration in Desert Palace)).  The 
Court observed that “Title VII’s silence” regarding the type of 
evidence necessary in mixed-motive cases “also suggests that 
we should not depart from the “‘[c]onventional rul[e] of civil 
litigation [that] generally appl[ies] in Title VII cases,’” which 
“requires a plaintiff to prove his case ‘by a preponderance of 
the evidence,’ . . . using ‘direct or circumstantial evidence.’”  
Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 
(1989) (alterations in Desert Palace)).   
 
 We have followed Desert Palace within and outside of 
the Title VII context.  See, e.g., Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail 
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Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
Desert Palace and stating that direct evidence is not required 
for a retaliation claim under the Federal Rail Safety Act); 
Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating 
that Desert Palace held that a plaintiff need not present direct 
evidence in a mixed-motive Title VII discrimination case).  In 
addition, the Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits have said that a plaintiff may establish an 
FMLA retaliation claim by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence.  See Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 
987, 999-1000, 1004-05 (10th Cir. 2011); Lewis v. Sch. Dist. 
#70, 523 F.3d 730, 742 (7th Cir. 2008); Hillstrom v. Best W. 
TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2003); Bachelder, 
259 F.3d at 1125. 
 
 Like Title VII, the FMLA is silent concerning whether 
direct evidence is required to prove a claim.  As a result, “we 
should not depart from the [c]onventional rule[s] of civil 
litigation,” which allow a plaintiff to prove his claim using 
direct or circumstantial evidence.  Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 
98-99 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, 
we join our sister circuits in applying Desert Palace and 
holding that direct evidence is not required to obtain a mixed-
motive instruction under the FMLA.    
 
 Here, the District Court denied Egan’s request for a 
mixed-motive instruction, explaining that “there was no direct 
evidence which was the qualifying ground for submitting” a 
mixed-motive instruction to the jury.  App. 509.  As discussed 
above, after Desert Palace, Egan was not required to produce 
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direct evidence to receive a mixed-motive instruction.4  Thus, 
the District Court erred in requiring Egan to produce direct 
evidence of retaliatory motive to obtain the mixed-motive 
instruction.  Rather, in response to the request for the 
instruction, the Court should have determined whether there 
was evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that the Port Authority had legitimate and illegitimate reasons 
for its employment decision and that Egan’s use of FMLA 
leave was a negative factor in the employment decision.5  We 
                                                                
4 While Defendants pointed to a few of our cases as 
authority that direct evidence is required for mixed-motive 
instructions in FMLA retaliation claims even after Desert 
Palace, we have not held as much because that issue was 
never outcome-determinative until this case.  See Ross v. 
Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the 
plaintiff did “not argue that his retaliation claims are mixed-
motive claims”); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302 (holding that 
whether the case could proceed under a mixed-motive 
instruction was not relevant because the case could proceed 
under “the more taxing McDonnell Douglas standard”); 
Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 136, 147 
(3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the defendant did not contest that 
the plaintiff supplied direct evidence). 
5 The Port Authority argues that this error in the jury 
instruction was harmless because the jury quickly returned a 
verdict finding that Egan’s use of FMLA leave was not the 
motivating factor for his termination.  A jury instruction error 
“is not harmless if it could have ‘reasonably . . . affected the 
outcome of the trial’ or if the jury ‘quite possibly’ relied on 
an erroneous instruction.’”  Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, 
Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 396 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hill v. 
Reederei F. Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 411 (3d 
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will therefore vacate the FMLA judgment entered in favor of 




 We next examine Egan’s assertion that the District 
Court abused its discretion by precluding Green’s testimony 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  We review a 
district court’s Rule 403 ruling for abuse of discretion, United 
States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537 (3d Cir. 2010), and 
reverse only if the error was not harmless.  
 
 “A district court has broad discretion to determine the 
admissibility of relevant evidence in response to an objection 
under Rule 403.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Under Rule 403, “the court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 403.  The Rule 403 inquiry is inexact, 
                                                                                                                                               
Cir. 2006), and Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 
228 (3d Cir. 2008)).  Here, the difference between “but-for” 
and "mixed-motive" instruction goes to the central issue 
before jury: Why was Egan fired?  There is no question that a 
significant change relating to this critical issue could have 
reasonably affected the outcome of the trial.  See Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 588 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the improper use of a “mixed-motive” 
instruction in a “but-for” case “shifted the burden of 
persuasion on a central issue in the case,” and therefore “the 
error cannot be harmless”). 
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“requiring sensitivity on the part of the trial court to the 
subtleties of the particular situation, and considerable 
deference on the part of the reviewing court to the hands-on 
judgment of the trial judge.”  Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 537 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “[w]e 
will not disturb the District Court’s ruling unless it was 
arbitrary or irrational.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).   If a trial court fails to articulate its balance 
between the probative value and the prejudicial effect of 
evidence, we either “decide the trial court implicitly 
performed the required balance; or, if we decide the trial court 
did not, we undertake to perform the balance ourself.”  United 
States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 If we conclude it was error to exclude or admit a piece 
of evidence, then we review the ruling to determine if the 
exclusion or admission of the evidence was harmless.  Under 
the harmless error standard, the erroneous exclusion or 
admission of evidence will not require reversal “if it is highly 
probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.”  
United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 326 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Here, the District Court sustained the Port Authority’s 
objection to Green’s testimony about a conversation between 
Venuto and Egan that he overheard.  The following occurred 
during Green’s direct examination: 
 
Q.  Did you ever hear Mr.—did you ever 
observe Mr. Egan and Mr. Venuto in Mr. 
Egan’s office? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  And what did you observe? 
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Mr. Davis [Port Authority’s counsel]:  
Objection, Your Honor. 
The Court:  Sustained. 
. . .  
Q.  When you observed them in their office, 
were you—were they having a conversation? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  And were you able to hear the conversation? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Can you please describe the conversation 
that Mr. Egan— 
The Court:  were you present in the room? 
The Witness:  No, Sir. 
The Court:  But you could hear the 
conversation? 
A.  Yes. 
. . .  
Q.  Where were you standing for this 
conversation? 
A.  I was walking down a corridor towards Mr. 
Egan’s office—actually, past Mr. Egan’s office, 
and I heard the conversation that way. 
Mr. Davis:  Objection, Your Honor. 
The Court:  Did you continue walking? 
The Witness:  Yes. 
The Court:  You didn’t stop to listen? 
The Witness:  No. 
The Court:  So you were able to hear this as 
you’re walking, the whole conversation? 
The Witness:  Not the whole conversation but a 
great deal.  They were pretty loud. 
Mr. Davis:  Objection, Your Honor. 
The Court:  Sustained. 
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Mr. Salmanson [Egan’s counsel]:  What’s the 
basis for the objection? 
The Court:  He didn’t hear the entire 
conversation. 
Mr. Salmanson:  And could he relay the part of 
the conversation he did hear? 
The Court:  No, because it would be incomplete 
and misleading. 
Mr. Salmanson:  I have nothing further, Your 
Honor. 
 
App. 170-72.  The transcript shows that the District Court did 
not explicitly conduct a balancing inquiry under Rule 403, but 
it did identify one 403 consideration, that admission of only a 
part of the conversation could be misleading.  While we 
strongly prefer that the District Court explain how it balanced 
the Rule 403 considerations, we will perform the balancing 
analysis ourselves to determine whether the District Court 
abused its discretion.  See Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 572.   
 
 First, we examine the probative value of the proposed 
testimony.  Green’s testimony, as shown in his deposition and 
the District Court’s summary judgment order, was probative 
of the Port Authority’s motivation in terminating Egan.  
Green testified in his deposition that he heard Egan and 
Venuto “having an exchange” when he was walking by 
Egan’s office.  App. 610.  He explained that: 
 
[W]hat I could hear was Mr. Egan telling Mr. 
Venuto that he couldn’t commit to a certain task 
because of his underlying health issues.  He 
wasn’t sure if he could commit to the deadline.  
And I overheard Mr. Venuto yelling, what can 
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you do, Joe, what can you do.  And at that time 
I turned around and went back to my office.  I 
didn’t want to be involved in that exchange. 
 
App. 610.  He also stated that Venuto “seemed pretty 
animated and pretty upset and angry.”  App. 611.  The 
District Court noted the potential probative value of this 
testimony in its order denying the Port Authority’s motion for 
summary judgment, where it noted that “[r]emarks made by 
Michael Venuto . . . may give rise to an inference of 
discriminatory animus as to Egan’s age, disability, and 
FMLA status” because “Green[ ] testified that Venuto voiced 
concerns over Egan’s ability to complete assignments due to 
his being out of work for health reasons.”  App. 613-14.  
Thus, even the District Court recognized that Green’s 
testimony about the conversation he overheard was probative 
of the Port Authority’s alleged discriminatory animus. 
 
 Having concluded that the evidence has probative 
value, we turn to the second part of the inquiry, namely 
whether the value is substantially outweighed by 
considerations in Rule 403 such as prejudice or misleading 
the jury.  Despite the testimony’s probative value, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the testimony 
at trial.  By the time Green’s testimony was offered, the 
District Court had heard Egan’s testimony.  Egan did not 
recount a conversation like the one Green said he partially 
overheard.  In addition, the District Court heard no testimony 
from Venuto about such a conversation.  Thus, the District 
Court was presented with a situation where neither participant 
in the conversation that Green partially overheard testified 
about it.  Given the great deference we pay to district courts’ 
Rule 403 rulings, even if we may have reached a different 
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ruling,6 we cannot say the Court here abused its discretion by 
precluding Green’s testimony, and we will not disturb the 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate and remand in part. 
                                                                
 6 Arguably, the District Court could have properly 
exercised its discretion and permitted the testimony given 
that: (1) the parties could have cross-examined Green about 
what he was able to hear; (2) participants in the conversation 
testified and could have been questioned about it; and (3) the 
jury could have given whatever weight it deemed warranted 
to the testimony from a witness who heard only part of a 
conversation.  Cf. United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 327-
28 (3d Cir. 2001)  (finding no abuse of discretion for 
admitting testimony when the court instructed the jury on the 
permissible uses of that testimony and the testimony “was 
properly challengeable, and was in fact challenged, by 
vigorous cross-examination”).    
 7 Because our ruling is based upon the trial record 
presented on this appeal, we render no opinion about the 
admissibility of the testimony at a subsequent trial if the 
evidence presented satisfies the District Court that its 




JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
  In our ruling today, we are required to defer to the 
Department of Labor’s interpretation of the FMLA.  While I 
concur in the judgment, I write separately to note my 
discomfort with our reasoning, which is dictated by the 
regimes of deference adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
(1997).  The doctrine of deference deserves another look.  
Chevron and Auer and their like are, with all respect, contrary 
to the roles assigned to the separate branches of government; 
they embed perverse incentives in the operations of 
government; they spread the spores of the ever-expanding 
administrative state; they require us at times to lay aside 
fairness and our own best judgment and instead bow to the 
nation’s most powerful litigant, the government, for no reason 
other than that it is the government.  The problems they create 
are serious and ought to be fixed. 
 
Our nation’s founders embraced the idea that freedom 
is best secured by dividing governmental power into distinct, 
structurally separate components.  James Madison famously 
wrote that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands …  may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  The Federalist 
No. 47; see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and 
Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1538 (1991) 
(noting that the constitutions of five states, including Virginia 
and Massachusetts, expressly separated governmental power 
in ways similar to the United States Constitution).  The 
Revolutionary generation had learned by hard experience 
“that abandonment of separated powers led directly to the loss 
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of accountable, impartial government, which, in turn, led 
inevitably to the loss of due process and individual rights.”  
Brown, supra at 1538; see also Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth 
J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 
Duke L.J. 449, 476 (1991) (observing that formal separation 
of powers is a prophylactic measure intended to prevent one 
branch’s accumulation and concentration of powers).  Our 
Constitution was thus framed specifically to avoid the 
concentration of powers in the hands of a single branch of 
government.  Chevron, however, has dramatically 
undermined that purpose.  
 
Each branch of government was meant to act as a 
check on the other so that power is not exercised without 
accountability.  See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, __ U.S. 
__, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1216 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“To the Framers, the separation of powers and checks and 
balances were more than just theories.  They were practical 
and real protections for individual liberty in the new 
Constitution.”).  The checking function of the courts is in our 
power of judicial review, it being “emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
Yet, the Supreme Court has created a doctrine that requires 
judges to ignore their own best judgment on how to construe 
a statute, if the executive branch shows up in court with any 
“reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.   
 
As though that were not bad enough, our hands are 
also tied when an agency interprets or reinterprets its own 
rules.  Those fetters were put in place by Auer v. Robbins, 
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which extended judicial deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of its rules, even in the midst of litigation.  519 
U.S. at 462 (1997).  The result today is that agencies are 
entitled to deference for their interpretation of statutes and 
then to a further dose of deference for their interpretation of 
the rules and regulations they layer on top of those statutes.1  
All the while, federal courts are pushed further and further 
away from our constitutional responsibility to “say what the 
law is.” 2  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177; see also Decker v. Nw. 
                                              
1 Agencies can also play a large role in the drafting and 
vetting of legislation, even before it is enacted, so they will at 
times have three bites at the law-making apple.  See 
Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826146 (presenting the results of 
extensive interviews and surveys with twenty federal 
agencies).  
 
2 Several states have expressly rejected the Chevron 
framework and their courts have refused to defer to state 
agency interpretations of state law.  See, e.g., Hughes Gen. 
Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 322 P.3d 712, 717-
18 (Utah 2014) (“openly repudiat[ing]” Chevron deference to 
agencies and “retain[ing] for the courts the de novo 
prerogative of interpreting the law, unencumbered by any 
standard of agency deference”); In re Complaint of Rovas 
Against SBC Mich., 754 N.W.2d 259, 272 (Mich. 2008) 
(“[T]he unyielding deference to agency statutory construction 
required by Chevron conflicts with … separation of powers 
principles … by compelling delegation of the judiciary’s 
constitutional authority to construe statutes to another branch 
of government.”); Pub. Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 
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Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (arguing that Auer deference “violate[s] a 
fundamental principle of separation of powers—that the 
power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest 
in the same hands”).  Chevron and the cases that have 
followed and expanded on it, including Auer, thus 
“undermine[] our obligation to provide a judicial check on the 
other branches, and … subject[] regulated parties to precisely 
the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”  Perez, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 
The deference required by Chevron not only erodes the 
role of the judiciary, it also diminishes the role of Congress.  
Under Chevron, “[s]tatutory ambiguity … becomes an 
implicit delegation of rule-making authority, and that 
authority is used not to find the best meaning of the text, but 
to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on 
policy judgments made by the agency rather than Congress.”  
Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 
2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).  And we in the courts 
have abetted that process, largely “abdicat[ing] our duty to 
enforce [the] prohibition” against Congressional delegation of 
legislative power to executive agencies.  Dep’t of Transp. v. 
Ass’n of Am. R.R., __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) 
(Thomas J., concurring).  The consequent aggrandizement of 
federal executive power at the expense of the legislature leads 
to perverse incentives, as Congress is encouraged to pass 
vague laws and leave it to agencies to fill in the gaps, rather 
                                                                                                     
A.2d 378, 382 (Del. 1999) (“Statutory interpretation is 




than undertaking the difficult work of reaching consensus on 
divisive issues.3   
 
Auer deference further accentuates the shift of power 
to the executive branch by encouraging agencies to 
promulgate regulations vague enough to allow administrators 
wide latitude in deciding how to govern.  See Perez, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) (critiquing Auer deference 
because it encourages agencies to “write substantive rules 
more broadly and vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled 
in later, using interpretive rules unchecked by notice and 
comment” rulemaking).  And govern they do, not merely by 
enforcing laws passed by the people’s representatives, but 
through their own vast and largely unaccountable power.  It 
is, in fact, a growing power.  Deference to agencies 
strengthens the executive branch not only in a particular 
dispute under judicial review; it tends to the permanent 
expansion of the administrative state.  Even if some in 
Congress want to rein an agency in, doing so is very difficult 
                                              
3 As well stated by Representative Bob Goodlatte, 
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Chevron 
deference “tempts Congress to let the hardest work of 
legislating bleed out of Congress and into the Executive 
Branch, since Congress knows judges will defer to agency 
interpretations of ambiguities and gaps in statutes Congress 
did not truly finish.” The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional 
and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies: 
Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (March 15, 2016) (Prepared Statement 




because of judicial deference to agency action.  Moreover, the 
Constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment 
(along with the President’s veto power), which were intended 
as a brake on the federal government, being “designed to 
protect the liberties of the people,” are instead, because of 
Chevron, “veto gates” that make any legislative effort to 
curtail agency overreach a daunting task.  Randy R. Barnett, 
Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and 
Sovereignty of We the People, 212 (2016).  
 
In short, Chevron “permit[s] executive bureaucracies 
to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative 
power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems 
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of 
the [F]ramers’ design.”  Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 
F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
That deterioration in the separation of powers is not merely a 
matter of abstract concern over political theory.  The point of 
structural separation is, again, the protection of individual 
liberty.  See NLRB v. Noel Canning, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 
2550, 2559 (2014) (“We recognize, of course, that the 
separation of powers can serve to safeguard individual 
liberty[.]”).  “The doctrine of the separation of powers was 
adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency 
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”  Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).   
 
When the power to create and interpret and enforce the 
law is vested in a single branch of government, the risk of 
arbitrary conduct is high and individual liberty is in jeopardy.  
An agency can change its statutory interpretation with 
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minimal justification and still be entitled to full deference 
from Article III courts.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n 
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
(“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze 
the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.”).  
Citizens are therefore left to the mercy of government 
functionaries who are free “to bend existing laws, to 
reinterpret and apply them retroactively in novel ways and 
without advance notice.”  Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 
1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  We would never allow a 
private litigant the power to authoritatively reinterpret the 
rules applicable to a dispute, yet we routinely allow the 
nation’s most prolific and powerful litigant, the government, 
to do exactly that.4  Agencies can make the ground rules and 
change them in the middle of the game.5   
                                              
4 The authority that agencies have to create binding 
law and reinterpret it at will may be heard as an echo of the 
royal prerogative to issue proclamations and interpret laws, a 
power claimed by British monarchs and widely rejected by 
Parliament and common law judges during the latter half of 
the 17th century.  See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative 
Law Unlawful?, 33-63 (2014).   
 
5 The Supreme Court has declared that deference is 
inappropriate when an agency’s reinterpretation of its 
regulation is “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating 
position’ … a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an 
agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack,” 
or would result in “unfair surprise.”  Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 
2167-68 (2012) (citations omitted) (second alteration in 
original).  In practice, however, deference is granted even to 
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I am not arguing that there is no role in our system of 
government for deference to administrative agencies.  They 
unquestionably have institutional expertise that allows them 
to understand some provisions of law “based upon more 
specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular 
case.”  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).  
Such expertise may give agencies and the courts assistance 
when confronting technical issues.  So, for instance, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is well qualified to 
determine what is the “just and reasonable” rate that utilities 
should pay when purchasing energy from other energy-
producing facilities.  Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power 
Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 415 (1983).  Likewise, the 
Treasury Department is in a good position to say whether 
certain revenue qualifies as “reserve strengthening.”  Atl. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 523 U.S. 382, 389-91 (1998).  And the 
Department of Energy can helpfully suggest whether “oil 
produced from tar sands” includes oil produced using 
enhanced extraction techniques.   Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                     
an agency’s poorly reasoned post-hoc rationalizations.  See 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or 
Less in Penn Twp., York Cty., Pa., Located on Tax ID 
#440002800150000000 Owned by Brown, 768 F.3d 300, 316 
(3d Cir. 2014) (Jordan J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority 
opinion for accepting an agency’s regulatory interpretation 
that the agency itself had once acknowledged was “at odds 
with … the common understanding” of the terms of the 
regulation and that was adopted in a footnote “in the middle 
of an unrelated rulemaking” as a “reaction to the District 




United States, 182 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 1999).  But 
Supreme Court precedent before Chevron already granted the 
“rulings, interpretations and opinions” of agencies a level of 
deference consistent with “the thoroughness evident in [the 
particular decision under] consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade.”  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  That level of 
deference appropriately takes into account an agency’s 
specialized knowledge while retaining for the judiciary the 
prerogative “to say what the law is.”  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
 
Highly specialized or technical matters are far 
different, however, than the legal matters on which federal 
courts are now routinely told, in the name of Chevron, to bow 
down and obey the executive branch.  The facts of this case 
illustrate the problem.  The Department of Labor is entitled to 
tell us where, in a vaguely worded portion of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), we are to look for a prohibition 
on retaliation against employees who take FMLA leave.  
Consequently, even though we determined years ago that 
retaliation claims arise under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), 
Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2004), we must now defer to the Department of 
Labor’s final rule concluding otherwise.6  Then, after 
                                              
6 Even the Department of Labor recognized that 
“section 2615(a)(2) of the Act also may be read to bar 
retaliation[.]”  Dep’t of Labor Rules and Regulations for the 
Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67934-01 
(Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).  But, 
because the Department “believe[d] that section 2615(a)(1) 
provides a clearer statutory basis for § 825.220(c)’s 
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deferring to the Department’s decision about which provision 
of the statute we are supposed to interpret, we must again 
defer to the Department when it delineates the rules of proof 
regarding such a claim and the kind of jury instruction that 
must be given.7  So much for the job of the judicial branch.    
 
Were we free to actually interpret the law rather than 
merely defer to an executive agency, we might well conclude 
that the FMLA does not allow for a mixed-motive instruction 
for Egan’s retaliation claim.  “Causation in fact – i.e., proof 
that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s 
injury – is a standard requirement of any tort claim.”  Univ. of 
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 
2524 (2013).  Therefore, “[a]bsent some reason to believe that 
Congress intended otherwise,” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 
557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009), an employee must prove that a 
“prohibited criterion was the but-for cause of [an employer’s] 
prohibited conduct.”  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.  While the 
terms of the FMLA do not expressly foreclose a mixed-
motive instruction, cf. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (emphasizing 
that the prohibition in the ADEA against discrimination 
“because of” an impermissible consideration was 
synonymous with a requirement of “but for” causation and 
foreclosed a mixed-motive instruction), neither do they 
mandate or even encourage such an instruction, cf. Nassar, 
                                                                                                     
prohibition of discrimination and retaliation[,]” we are 
obligated to defer to that belief and limit our examination to 
§ 2615(a)(1). 
 
7 The differences between “mixed motive” and 
“pretext” employment discrimination cases are ably described 
in the majority opinion.  (Maj. Op. at 7 n.1.)  
11 
 
133 S. Ct. at 2534 (emphasizing that the prohibition in Title 
VII against retaliation when an impermissible characteristic 
was a “motivating factor” clearly permitted a mixed- motive 
instruction).  Therefore, the default standard of “but for” 
causation seems to be applicable and a mixed-motive 
instruction would seem out of order.8  Nevertheless, because 
the Department of Labor has interpreted the statute 
                                              
8 Neither Section 2615(a)(1) nor (a)(2) contains 
causation language akin to either the “because of” language 
of the ADEA or the “motivating factor” language of Title VII.  
29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1)-(2).  Section 2615(a)(2) prohibits 
discrimination against an individual “for opposing any 
practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”  Id. at 
§ 2615(a)(2).  A subsequent section, 2615(b), prohibits 
discharging someone “because such [an] individual” filed 
charges, gave information in an inquiry, or testified in a 
proceeding related to the rights protected by the FMLA – 
language closer to that found in the ADEA.  Id. at § 2615(b).  
The best reading of Section 2615(a)(2) might thus involve 
reading the “for opposing” language in harmony with the 
“because” language from the subsequent section to conclude 
that “but for” causation is required.  See Food & Drug Admin. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 121 
(2000) (noting that courts “must place [statutory] provision[s] 
in context, interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical and 
coherent regulatory scheme”).  Regardless, there is no 
language akin to “motivating factor” indicating that 
something less than “but for” causation is in order and so the 
default rule laid out in Gross and Nassar indicates that a 




differently, we are obliged to fall in line and adopt a standard 
for FMLA claims that Congress has never embraced.   
 
The consequences of this particular distortion of 
government functioning are foreseeable.  As the Supreme 
Court noted in Nassar, “claims of retaliation are being made 
with ever-increasing frequency” and “lessening the causation 
standard could … contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, 
which would siphon resources from efforts by employer[s], 
administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace 
harassment.”  133 S. Ct. at 2531-32.  Allowing claims to go 
forward on the terms dictated by the Department of Labor is a 
shift in public policy that should be debated and crafted 
within the legislative branch rather than being announced by 
unelected officials in an administrative agency.  Yet, based on 
the judgment of someone inside the Department tasked with 
enforcing the FMLA, and despite the District Court’s effort to 
say what the law is, employers will now face a lower 
threshold of liability than they would have under the default 
causation standard.  It is worth pondering how we arrived at 
this point.9  The trajectory is more important than the result in 
this particular case.   
                                              
9 Some elected officials are taking note.  Recently, 
Congress considered restoring full judicial review of agency 
action.  On January 12, 2017, the House of Representatives 
passed The Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, which, if 
passed by the Senate and signed into law, would prevent 
courts from deferring to certain agency determinations and 
instead require review of those determinations for “abuse of 
agency discretion.”  H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 107(c)-(d) (2017) 
(proposing amendments to 5 U.S.C. § 706).   
 
